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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ohio has a polarized history of water-resource management and planning.  In 
1925, Alfred Bettman, an Ohio-native and corporate lawyer, gained national 
recognition as the innovator of comprehensive planning when he proposed, and the 
City of Cincinnati adopted, the country’s first comprehensive plan to “guide growth 
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and structure” in pursuit of “public health, safety, and welfare.”1  In the same year, 
the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning in 
Pritz v. Messer.2  The United States Supreme Court followed Ohio’s lead one year 
later in 1926, upholding the constitutionality of zoning in the landmark case Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.3  In stark contrast, Ohio’s poor planning and water-
resource management has been subject to national criticism and jokes—most 
famously in 1969, when the grossly-polluted Cuyahoga River caught on fire.4   
                                                          
 
1
 STUART MECK & KENNETH PEARLMAN, OHIO PLANNING AND ZONING LAW 4 (2007).  In 
1915, Alfred Bettman decided that city planning was the key to reforming municipal 
corruption over zoning ordinances and, therefore, proposed a bill that authorized citizen-run 
planning commissions to create municipal plans that, once adopted, could not be disregarded 
by city council.  Lora A. Lucero, The American Planning Association and Trends in Land Use 
Litigation, in CURRENT TRENDS AND PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR LAND USE LAW AND ZONING 
85, 98 n.13 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2004) [hereinafter “CURRENT TRENDS”].  This legislation 
was the first of its kind influencing planning and zoning laws throughout the country.  Id.  
Bettman was a principal drafter of the Standard City Planning and Zoning Enabling Statutes 
of 1935 and founder of the American City Planning Institute.  Id.  He also wrote an amicus 
brief on behalf of the National Conference on City Planning, Ohio State Conference on City 
Planning, and the National Housing Board in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.  Id. at 87.    
 
2
 Pritz v. Messer, 149 N.E. 30, 37 (Ohio 1925), overruled on other grounds by Hudson v. 
Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852, 855-56 (Ohio 1984).  Alfred Bettman wrote as amici curiae 
for the City of Cincinnati against a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance establishing 
districts in the city with specific limitations including building heights and set-backs.  Id. at 
32.  The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance because 
“[u]nder the police power society may restrict the use of property without making 
compensation therefor, if the restriction be reasonably necessary for the preservation of the 
public health, morals, or safety” and restrictions of building heights and set-backs have such 
“a relation to the public health and safety.”  Id. at 33-34 (citing State v. Cunningham, 119 N.E. 
361 (Ohio 1918). 
 
3
 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926); MECK & PEARLMAN, 
supra note 1, at 4-5.  An Ohio district court struck down the Village of Euclid’s zoning 
ordinance as exceeding municipal police power, concluding that this type of land-use 
regulation amounted to a “taking” of Ambler’s property in violation of eminent domain.  See 
Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 314-15, 317 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 272 
U.S. 365 (1926) (stating that while “police power is not susceptible of exact definition . . . . 
[I]t is not true that the public welfare is a justification for the taking of private property for the 
general good”).  Ambler’s arguments relied on individual property rights and the potential 
value of the property if used for industry purposes rather than residential, as the zoning 
ordinance required.  See Lucero, supra note 1, at 88.  Bettman argued to the Supreme Court 
that the constitutionality of zoning ordinances should be upheld where the goal was to 
“prevent developments that might have a ‘detrimental effect upon public health, safety, 
convenience, morals, and welfare.’”  Id.  Bettman rebutted Ambler’s argument by stating that 
“specific claims of unfairness to the property owner could be dealt with individually without 
barring zoning altogether” and the Supreme Court agreed upholding the constitutionality of 
the ordinance.  Id.  
 
4
 DAVID ZWICK & MARCY BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND 3 (1972).  The Cuyahoga 
River in central Cleveland ignited into flames after oil and industrial waste entered the water 
on June 22, 1969.  Id.  Clevelanders joked that “[a]nyone who falls into the Cuyahoga does 
not drown . . . . He decays.”  The Cities: The Price of Optimism, TIME, Aug. 1, 1969, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901182,00.html.  Apparently 
the Cuyahoga burned periodically since John D. Rockefeller built refineries along its banks in 
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Adding to the embarrassment, Congress cited the Cuyahoga “Burning River” 
incident as good reason for more comprehensive federal regulation over water 
pollution.5  The collective failure of state governments to manage water pollution 
spurred the enactment of the Clean Water Act in 1972.6  However, the Clean Water 
Act does not directly regulate all aspects of water pollution; the greatest contributor 
to water pollution, “nonpoint source” pollution,7 is left to state management.8   
Optimal management and conservation of water resources requires a holistic 
approach and planning model.  This is because adequate water quality requires 
conscientious land use planning, and the two are inextricably linked.9  Land use 
planning and water-resource management must be part of a comprehensive plan with 
hydrological boundaries as its geographic borders. 
Yet, unlike a number of states, Ohio follows the opposite approach.10  Land use 
decision-making is a product of zoning regulations enacted in accordance with 
                                                          
the 1860s.  See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of 
Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 99-104 (2002). 
 
5
 See Adler, supra note 4, at 90 n.5 (citing Water Pollution – 1970, Part 2: Hearings 
before the S. Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Comm. on Public Works, 91st 
Cong. 412 (1970)) (statement of Carl B. Stokes, Mayor of Cleveland);  Solid Waste Agency 
of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174-75 (2001) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 
6
 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1266-1268 (2006).  See generally Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal 
Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 
1167 (1983) (discussing the requirements and regulations under the Clean Water Act); Adler, 
supra note 4, at 129-31.  Congress specifically targeted the Great Lakes for cleanup.  33 
U.S.C. § 1268. 
 
7
 A “nonpoint source” is any source without a discrete source of discharge—such as an 
industrial facility or power plant.  See infra Part II.B.  The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) defines 
a “point source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not 
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling 
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged.”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006).  The Code also defines a 
“source” as “any building, structure, facility, or installation from which there is or may be the 
discharge of pollutants.”  Id. § 1316(a)(3).  The CWA does not define “nonpoint source” other 
than everything else other than “point sources.”  See id. § 1362. 
 
8
 See sources infra note 45.  
 
9
 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATERSHEDS: A WATERSHED APPROACH, 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/ approach.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) [hereinafter 
“U.S. EPA WATERSHED APPROACH”] (land use activities directly affect the health of water 
quality in a watershed); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, BENEFITS DERIVED 
FROM TAKING A WATERSHED APPROACH, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/framework/ch5.html (last revised Sept. 12, 2008) 
[hereinafter “U.S. EPA WATERSHED BENEFITS”]; A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local 
Governments in Watershed Management, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 149 (2002).   
 
10
 Florida, Oregon, California, New York, Maryland, New Jersey, Washington, 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Hawaii, Montana, and Georgia have all adopted comprehensive, 
statewide land-use planning approaches.  See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. 
ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 501-03, 505 (2d ed. 
2007) (discussing the details of a few of these states’ comprehensive plans). 
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political boundaries rather than hydrological “watershed” boundaries.11  Political 
boundaries follow a land use planning model that no longer meets the ecological 
needs of the state because “water knows no boundaries,” making political boundaries 
superficial parameters for abating water pollution.12  
Ohio’s current zoning practices further entrench political boundaries as the 
dominant land use approach because, while the state’s townships and counties enact 
zoning regulations in accordance with a comprehensive plan, municipalities 
endowed with home-rule powers may zone in the absence of any plan.13  This 
piecemeal approach to zoning and land use exacerbates nonpoint source water 
pollution in the state.14  The solution for reducing nonpoint source pollution is 
statewide adoption of a “watershed-approach” to zoning and land use planning.  This 
is a comprehensive plan with a dual purpose—preserve water quality and regulate 
land use activities uniformly—to reduce nonpoint source pollution.15 
This Article advocates that Ohio adopt a mandatory “watershed-approach” to 
land use planning and zoning throughout the state.  Ohio should adopt this approach 
to increase water quality in the state by reducing nonpoint source pollution, achieve 
greater environmental regulation uniformity, and offset the unfettered zoning power 
of municipalities operating in the absence of a comprehensive plan.  
Part II discusses the environmental problem of water pollution and why curbing 
nonpoint source pollution is truly a state’s burden that requires legislative attention 
and reform.  Part III.A explains the solution to nonpoint source pollution in Ohio—
implementation of a mandatory statewide “watershed approach” model to land use 
planning and zoning; Part III.B discusses the current voluntary efforts in Ohio to 
implement watershed-approach planning and the perceived legal barriers to their 
success. 
Part IV.A explains the following: (1) the current structure of zoning and land use 
practices among Ohio local governments; (2) why these practices are inadequate to 
reduce nonpoint source water pollution; and (3) why mandating a watershed-
approach to zoning in the state is constitutionally permissible under the Home Rule 
Amendment of the Ohio Constitution.  Lastly, Part IV.C opines that home rule is a 
                                                          
 
11
 See discussion infra Parts III.A, IV.A. 
 
12
 See MILWAUKEE PUB. POLICY FORUM REPORT, Clean Water, Healthy Future: Asset 
Management for Regional Prosperity, Feb. 2006, REG’L REPORT, at 2, available at 
http://www.publicpolicyforum.org/pdfs/ CleanWaterRegional.pdf; Charles P. Lord et al., 
Natural Cities: Urban Ecology and the Restoration of Urban Ecosystems, 21 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 
317, 329 (2003). 
 
13
 See MECK & PEARLMAN, supra note 1, at 5-6.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 519.02 
(Westlaw 2010); Cent. Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike, 409 N.E.2d 258, 280 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1979) (“Ohio law does not require a municipality to adopt a comprehensive zoning plan 
as a condition precedent to the enactment of zoning legislation.”). 
 
14
 See, e.g., Paula J. Lebowitz, Land Use, Land Abuse and Land Re-Use: A Framework for 
the Implementation of TMDLs for Nonpoint Source Polluted Waterbodies, 19 PACE  ENVTL. L. 
REV. 97, 122 (2001) (“The regulation of land use has been delegated from the state to the 
municipalities . . . that allows them nearly exclusive control over the determination of how 
land within the municipality will be used. By and large, this system of fragmented local 
control has been a failure in the protection of environmental resources and water quality.”).   
 
15
 See discussion infra Part III.A., Part III.B. 
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political barrier rather than a legal one, and, therefore, statewide adoption of a 
watershed plan for land use ultimately confronts the challenge of overcoming 
political opposition.  
II.  MANAGING WATER POLLUTION: A STATE OBLIGATION 
A.  History and Purpose of the Clean Water Act 
National legislative concern over water pollution originated with Congress’s 
enactment of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,16 making it a crime for any person 
or industry to discharge refuse into tributaries and navigable waters of the United 
States without a permit.17  It was not until the Water Quality Improvement Act of 
196518 that states were collectively subject to federal enforcement of comprehensive 
water-resource management.19  The Act encouraged states to adopt effluent 
limitations20—pollutant discharge maximums—and water quality standards for all 
water bodies; but at that time, the Act had limited enforcement power and failed to 
reduce water pollution.21  Sweeping enforcement power came in the 1972 Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments,22 known as the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”) of 1972.  The CWA required states to issue water quality standards for 
intrastate waters subject to federal approval.23   
The CWA of 1972 is the principal body of water pollution law currently in effect, 
and has the stated purpose of “[r]estor[ing] and maintain[ing] [the] chemical, 
physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”24  To accomplish this, the 
CWA introduced a federal permit system to regulate point source contributors of 
water pollution—discrete conveyances of discharge—and delegated to the states the 
role of administering the permit program as well as enforcing water quality standards 
and effluent limitations for all direct discharges into surface waters.25  Nonpoint 
                                                          
 
16
 Pub. L. No. 9-245, 30 Stat. 1151 (1899) (codified as 33 U.S.C. §§ 403-404, 406 (2006)).  
 
17
 See 33 U.S.C. § 407.  
 
18
 Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (superseded 1972).  Although, “[s]erious 
federal interest in protection of surface waters extends back as far as 1948 when Congress 
passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.”  Shimshon Balanson, Note, Holding Nature 
Responsible: The Natural Conditions Exception to Water Quality Standards of the Clean 
Water Act, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2008). 
 
19
 Gaba, supra note 6, at 1177-78. 
 
20
 See id. at 1178-80.  “Effluent” refers to waste material that is discharged into the 
environment.  See CWA § 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (2006).  “Effluent limitations” 
refers to the restriction on the quantity, rate, and concentration of such waste that is discharged 
into navigable waters.  Id. 
 
21
 See Gaba, supra note 6, at 1178-80. 
 
22
 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (2006) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387). 
 
23
 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1313(a)(1); PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. 
Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704 (1994). 
 
24
 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).  
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sources—diffuse contaminants without a discrete origination—are specifically 
exempt from the CWA permit program.26 
Federal regulatory mandates regarding nonpoint source pollution have a shorter 
history.  The 1987 Amendments to the CWA introduced nonpoint source pollution 
into its regulatory framework in Sections 208 and 319.27  Section 208 calls for states’ 
participation in three ways: (1) assess damage to water quality attributable to 
nonpoint source pollution; (2) develop programs to abate it—regulatory or non-
regulatory; and (3) submit these programs, “Section 208 Plans,” to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S. EPA”) for approval.  Section 208 plans are 
included in Ohio’s required Water Quality Management (“WQM”) Plan—a report 
which has been referred to as “an encyclopedia . . . used to plot and direct actions 
that abate pollution and preserve clean water”; the WQM Plan addresses nine 
elements of water quality that the state supervises, including nonpoint sources.28  
Another reporting requirement, pursuant to Section 303(d), is that Ohio identify 
annually all “impaired” surface waters—those water bodies within the state’s 
borders that fail to meet the state-established water quality standards.29 
The CWA Section 319 adds financial muscle to its ambitious nonpoint source 
management program—marrying the federal government’s interest in controlling 
                                                          
 
25
 See id. § 1342.  The CWA is triggered by the “discharge of any pollutant from a point 
source into the navigable waters of the United States.”  Ass’n to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and 
Totten Inlets v. Taylor Res., Inc. 299 F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002).  Point sources cannot 
discharge pollutants into navigable surface waters without a permit from the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).  See id. § 1342 (establishing NPDES). 
 
26
 See id. § 1342; Ore. Natural Res. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 849 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (stating, “[w]hen Congress established the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) in 1972 and concomitantly created a new approach to 
regulating and abating water pollution, it drew a distinct line between point and nonpoint 
pollution sources.  Point sources are subject to direct federal regulation and enforcement under 
[ 33 U.S.C. § 1342]. Nonpoint sources, because of their very nature, are not regulated under 
the NPDES.” (citations and footnotes omitted)).   
 
27
 Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987) (now codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1288 
(2006)); see 33 U.S.C. § 1329; Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1352 (N.D. Cal. 
2000); see also Ore. Natural Res. Council, 834 F.2d at 849 n. 12 (noting that “Congress 
recently amended [this year] the Clean Water Act and added a new provision dealing with 
nonpoint  sources of pollution” and that Congress added to section 1251(a) that “it is the 
national policy that programs for the control of nonpoint sources of pollution be developed 
and implemented”). 
 
28
 OHIO ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY DIV. OF SURFACE WATER, OHIO 2008 FINAL INTEGRATED 
REPORT- SECTION C: MANAGING WATER QUALITY C-10 (2008), http://www.epa.ohio.gov/ 
portals/35/tmdl/2008IntReport/Final_SectionC_ProgramSummaries.pdf  [hereinafter “OEPA 
2008 WATER QUALITY REPORT SECTION C: MANAGING WATER QUALITY”]; see 33 U.S.C. § 
1313(d) (requiring State WQM Plans).  The CWA requires that the State WQM Plans 
include—total daily maximum loads (TMDLs), effluent limits, municipal and industrial waste 
treatment, nonpoint source management and control, management agencies, implementation 
measures, dredge and fill program, basin plans, and ground water.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); 
OEPA 2008 WATER QUALITY REPORT SECTION C-MANAGING WATER QUALITY; see generally 
40 C.F.R. §§ 130.1-130.15 (1994) (federal regulations addressing these plans).  
 
29
 See Clean Water Act (CWA) § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006).  
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss2/8
2010] CROSSING THE HOME-RULE BOUNDARIES 469 
 
nonpoint source pollution with continual state needs for funding.30  It is a grant 
program, administered by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (“OEPA”), 
that annually distributes federal grants specifically targeted for communities’ and 
organizations’ uses to correct water quality impairments caused by nonpoint source 
pollution.31  These federal grants are Ohio’s primary funding source for nonpoint 
source pollution abatement.  Subsidized costs offer part, but not all, of a regulatory 
solution, because these grants require willing and able takers, meaning that the true 
“cornerstone of Ohio’s 319 program is working with watershed groups and others 
who are implementing locally developed watershed management plans” to reduce 
nonpoint source pollution.32  While the CWA reporting requirements and subsequent 
amendments have directed states’ attention to the problem of nonpoint source 
pollution—and backed that directive with federal monies, although the sufficiency of 
funding is a hotly debated point—the regulatory structure is a relatively new one, 
and it requires state action in the absence of a federal “how-to.”  As such, this Article 
argues that increased legislative attention and policy-making is necessary for this 
cognizable problem. 
B.  Sources of Water Pollution: Point Source and Nonpoint Source 
Distinguishing the sources of water pollution is biologically and legally 
significant.  All water pollution originates from point sources, nonpoint sources, or 
both.  Point sources are discrete points of discharge—such as manufacturing plants, 
factories, pipes, and sewage plants—and are subject to the NPDES permit program 
for any and all direct discharges into surface waters.33  More than three decades after 
the NPDES permit program began, Ohio, like most other states, implemented the 
NPDES with minimal difficulty and reduced point source pollution effectively.34  
Nonpoint source pollution is the leading cause of water pollution in the United 
States.35  Unlike point sources, nonpoint sources are not attributable to a single or 
                                                          
 
30
 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, POLLUTED RUNOFF (NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION): 
CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 319, http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/cwact.html (last visited Dec. 
22, 2008). 
 
31
 See OEPA, SECTION 319 GRANT PROGRAM, 
http://www.epa.ohio.gov/dsw/nps/319program.aspx#success (last visited Oct. 26, 2009) 
[hereinafter OEPA SECTION 319 GRANT PROGRAM].  
 
32
 See OEPA SECTION 319 PROGRAM, supra note 31. 
 
33
 See sources supra note 23.  Point sources comprise mostly of the following types—
Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTWs), Combined Sewer Systems (CSSs), and 
industrial facilities.  See generally OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3745:38-03 (2000); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 6111.01 (LexisNexis 2010).  POTWs are treatment plants for municipal sewage, the 
used water of a community including waterborne waste from residences, business, and 
industry.  See generally OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3745:3-01 (2002) (definitions).  CSSs are a 
combination of street storm sewers and residential sewers, eliminating the need for two 
separate systems.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6117.01(A)(9). 
 
34
 See OHIO EPA, OHIO NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM, 
http://www.epa.state.oh.us/dsw/nps/ index.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) [hereinafter 
“OEPA NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION”] (noting that the CWA’s point source regulations are 
effective at reducing point source pollution in Ohio’s waters).  
 
35
 See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 
REPORT TO CONGRESS; 2002 REPORTING CYCLE, 
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defined point of discharge and constitute a wider span of contaminants because the 
pollution is discharged over an expansive land area.36  Nonpoint sources are diffuse 
forms of pollution caused by sediment, nutrients, and organic and toxic substances 
originating from land-use activities, all carried to lakes and streams by surface 
runoff.37  Nonpoint source pollution occurs due to contamination that accumulates en 
route from wherever the runoff originated.38  The pollution results from storm water 
and melted snow runoff that drains over surfaces to everywhere that water 
accumulates.39   
Nonpoint source pollution is attributable to common land-use activities—
agriculture, farming, construction, mining, development complexes, golf courses, 
paved driveways, and parking lots.40  In communities where land use development 
occurs in the absence of conscientious planning, the runoff channels and drains to 
wherever the land or gravity takes it— neighboring “downstream” towns, lakes, 
streams, basements, storm sewers, or groundwater.41  Increasing impervious 
surfaces—hard surfaces impenetrable by water runoff, such as parking lots—harms 
water quality.42  When impervious cover of land areas increase, it forces water to run 
off of these surfaces at a greater speed, which in turn creates several effects: (1) the 
                                                          
http://www.epa.gov/305b/2002report/report2002305b.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2009); see also 
League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 
1181, 1184  (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that nonpoint source pollution is the “largest source of 
water pollution in the United States, far outstripping point source pollution from factories, 
sewage plants, and chemical spills.”); Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1338 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000) (acknowledging that ‘nonpoint source pollution has become the dominant water 
quality problem in the United States’).  
 
36
 See Forsgren, 309 F.3d at 1184; William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the 
Clean Water Act Been a Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 560-64 (2004). 
 
37
 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER GLOSSARY, 
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/dictionary.html#W (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
 
38
 Forsgren, 309 F.3d at 1186 (citing Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 
1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1998)); Andreen supra note 36, at 562-65. 
 
39
 See OEPA NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION, supra note 34; John R. Nolon, In Praise of 
Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 369 
(2002).  
 
40
 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE WATERSHED PROTECTION APPROACH: AN OVERVIEW 1 
(1991), available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=100001ZK.txt 
[hereinafter “U.S. EPA WATERSHED PROTECTION APPROACH”]; see Tahoe-Sierra Pres. 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (noting the connection 
between land use and nonpoint source pollution).  
 
41
 See generally Boettler v. Bd. of Twp. Trs., Green Twp., 165 N.E.2d 705, 708-10 (Ohio 
C.P. Summit County 1960) (recognizing the “downstream” effect of land development and 
increasing surface water movement to neighboring municipalities); OEPA NONPOINT SOURCE 
POLLUTION, supra note 34. 
 
42
 OHIO ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DIVISION OF SURFACE WATER, OHIO 2008 FINAL 
INTEGRATED REPORT- SECTION A: AN OVERVIEW OF WATER QUALITY, A-9-A-10, available for 
download at http://www.epa.ohio.gov/dsw/tmdl/ 
2008IntReport/2008OhioIntegratedReport.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2010) [hereinafter 
“OEPA 2008 WATER QUALITY REPORT SECTION A: OVERVIEW”]. 
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rate of stream erosion increases, hindering the stream’s ability to assimilate nutrients 
and pollution; (2) higher volumes of runoff increase the amount of pollutants; and 
(3) surface water temperatures rise after runoff is carried over hot surfaces and enters 
the stream, thereafter reducing oxygen concentrations necessary for healthy aquatic 
life.43  An increase in impervious cover is inevitable as communities develop, so 
without the realistic option of reducing impervious surfaces, the size and placement 
of those surfaces is even more critical.   
  Most significantly, the deteriorative effect of nonpoint source pollution is a 
cumulative result of land use, making “spot” improvements to runoff ultimately 
ineffective.44  Traditionally, states regulate land use within their borders, and the 
CWA’s provisions do not interfere with that tradition to the extent that the CWA 
requires states to monitor nonpoint source pollution and reduce it.  But, as noted, the 
CWA stops short of instructing how states must accomplish this.45 
Environmental experts and agencies recognize that the abstract and amorphous 
nature of nonpoint source pollution makes it the most difficult to manage.46  
Moreover, the experts and agencies agree that effective management of nonpoint 
source pollution requires a partnership between the biological needs of surface 
waters and control over land use activities contributing to nonpoint source 
pollution.47  Yet, such collaboration rarely occurs; in Ohio, municipal zoning and 
land use occurs without consideration to the impact on nonpoint source pollution. 
                                                          
 
43
 Id. at A-10. 
 
44
 See generally OEPA NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION, supra note 34.  
 
45
 See Clean Water Act (CWA) § 208, 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2006); CWA § 319, 33 U.S.C. § 
1329; Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp.2d 1337, 1341-42, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (explaining 
that the Clean Water Act of 1972 intended to address all sources of pollution, but because of 
the nature of nonpoint source pollution, the Act intended “to mitigate nonpoint-source 
pollution through state land-use regulation.”)   The OEPA states that “[a]ll pollution is not 
created equally” when referring to the distinct obligations of the state and federal governments 
for controlling water pollution.  OEPA NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION, supra note 34. The 
agency notes that although “[t]raditional images of water pollution often consist of a pipe 
spewing industrial contaminants into a river,” the federal Clean Water Act has mostly solved 
this problem because the Act mandates environmental policies and controls for point source 
pollution.  Id.  But the agency recognizes that reducing nonpoint source pollution remains an 
unmet problem because nonpoint source pollution is the result of land use and controlling land 
use is a power of the state.  Id.  So, although the Clean Water Act “call[s] upon states to 
develop comprehensive plans to manage nonpoint source pollution,” the Act does not mandate 
a particular plan.  Id.  
 
46
 See, e.g., OEPA NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION, supra note 34; Steven J. Hipfel, 
Enforcement of Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Control and Abatement Measures 
Applicable to Federal Facilities, Activities and Land Management Practices under Federal 
and State Law, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 75, 80-81 (2001) (stating that “[r]egulators have identified 
watershed management as the necessary mechanism for controlling and abating nonpoint 
source water pollution because this approach involves examination of all water quality 
stressors within a defined water basin instead of viewing individual pollutant sources in 
isolation.”); Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Pollution: Can It Be Done?, 
65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 480-82 (1989).  
 
47
 See U.S. EPA WATERSHED APPROACH, supra note 9; OEPA NONPOINT SOURCE 
POLLUTION, supra note 34 and text accompanying note 45.  Professor Tarlock advocates for 
watershed management as an optimal approach yet local governments “face formidable 
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C.  Water as a Resource: Maintaining Water Quality Standards 
The state of Ohio is “water-rich,” bordered on its North by Lake Erie, and on its 
south by the Ohio River, with thousands of miles of surface waters in between.48  
Ensuring suitable conditions of these waters is critical because they support the 
state’s needs for drinking water and recreational and economic activities, all of 
which contribute to a robust standard of living and state economy.49  In fact, Ohio’s 
surface waters, not groundwater, are the primary water source for drinking, 
swimming, boating, fishing, industrial operations, power generation, irrigation, and 
mining.50 
Pursuant to the CWA, all states adopt water quality standards “to protect, 
maintain and improve the quality of the nation’s surface waters.”51  “Water quality 
standards” set upper limits on the amount of pollution permitted in surface waters.52  
These water quality standards are ambient standards rather than discharge standards, 
but ambient standards form the basis of direct pollutant discharge limitations into 
surface waters under the federal permit program.53  
The OEPA monitors the state’s water quality and promulgates its water quality 
standards.54  One component of Ohio’s water quality standards is a “designated 
use.”55  The OEPA assigns a designated use for each water body segment—drinking, 
recreation, or industrial uses.56  All surface waters must attain the water quality 
standards for their respective designated use.57 
  Pursuant to the CWA Section 305, the OEPA generates a biennial report 
indicating the general conditions of the state’s surface waters and identifies all 
                                                          
boundaries in trying to adapt their land use and related powers to watershed governance.  
Local governments are locked into their jurisdictional ‘box’ that . . . boundary laws draw.”  
Tarlock, supra note 9, at 161.  For this reason, collaboration is rare, stating that “[t]he first 
barrier [to watershed planning] is the concept of watershed itself.”  Id. at 162. 
 
48
 OEPA 2008 WATER QUALITY REPORT SECTION A: OVERVIEW, supra note 42, at A-1.  
 
49
 Id.   
 
50
 Id.  
 
51
 OEPA 2008 WATER QUALITY REPORT SECTION C: MANAGING WATER QUALITY, supra 
note 28, at C-15; see Clean Water Act (CWA) § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
 
52
 OEPA 2008 WATER QUALITY REPORT SECTION C: MANAGING WATER QUALITY, supra 
note 28, at C-15. 
 
53
 Id.   
 
54
 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a)(2)-(3)(A) (every state develops water quality standards for 
each of its bodies of water); see generally OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3745-1-01 (2007).  For an 
explanation of Ohio’s water quality standards, see OHIO EPA, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS 
OVERVIEW, http://epa.ohio.gov/dsw/wqs/index.aspx (last visited March 18, 2010) [hereinafter 
“OEPA WATER QUALITY STANDARDS”]. 
 
55
 See OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3745-1-02.  Ohio water quality standards contain four key 
components: (1) beneficial use designations; (2) numeric criteria; (3) narrative criteria; and (4) 
biological criteria.  See 3745-1-01-3745-1-54.  
 
56
 See OEPA WATER QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 54. 
 
57
 Id.  
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss2/8
2010] CROSSING THE HOME-RULE BOUNDARIES 473 
 
“impaired” waters—those failing to attain purity minimums.58  This state-level 
review further enables the OEPA to establish effluent limitations—pollutant 
discharge maximums—for all water bodies.59  When Ohio’s surface waters fail to 
attain the water quality standards based on the OEPA’s effluent limitations, then the 
effluent limitations are increased, and discharge maximums are decreased.60  
Effluent limitations are increased—meaning that pollutant discharge must 
decrease—to improve water quality and compensate for pollution levels. 
Heightened effluent limitations remain in place until the water body attains its 
designated purity level.61  The assignment of total maximum daily loadings 
(TMDLs) is a pollutant-control program to identify and restore polluted waters.62  
TMDLs are best-estimate calculations generated by the OEPA of the total combined 
amount of water pollution of point and nonpoint sources for each water body.63  In 
addition, states calculate a TMDL amount for each pollutant found in impaired 
waters.64 
States that effectively manage nonpoint source pollution have an economic 
advantage over those states that do not.65  Put most simply, water quality standards 
and TMDLs equate to a “total” pollution amount, without distinguishing between 
point sources and nonpoint sources.66    TMDLs are mandatory; therefore, when 
reduction in pollution is necessary, point sources, rather than nonpoint sources, must 
reduce their discharge levels into impaired waters.67  Increasing control over point 
sources is problematic; many of Ohio’s point sources make up profitable industries 
in the state, contributing revenue, creating jobs, and reducing property taxes for 
residents.68  Therefore, when Ohio forces point sources to reduce discharges beyond 
                                                          
 
58
 The biennial report satisfies the CWA’s Section 305(b) water quality reports and 
Section 303(d) lists of impaired waters.  See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1315(b)(1), 1313(d); 40 C.F.R. § 
130.8 (water quality report).  
 
59
 See generally Columbus & Franklin County Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 
1042 (Ohio 1992); Andreen, supra note 36, at 548-52.   
 
60
 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C); Gaba, supra note 6, at 1169-70.   
 
61
 Gaba, supra note 6, at 1169-70. 
 
62
 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF CURRENT TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD: 
PROGRAM AND REGULATIONS, http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/overviewoftmdl.html (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2008).   
 
63
 Id.  
 
64
 Id. 
 
65
 Id.  For more detailed information on the economic benefits and detriments of water 
pollution, see RICHARD L. REVESZ, FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 68-90 
(1997); JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
233-41 (2003); U.S. EPA WATERSHED BENEFITS, supra note 9.  
 
66
 U.S. EPA WATERSHED BENEFITS, supra note 9; see also Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 
1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (following the EPA’s interpretation that TMDLs apply to both nonpoint 
and point sources). 
 
67
 Pronsolino, 291 F.3d 1123.; U.S. EPA WATERSHED BENEFITS, supra note 9. 
 
68
 See OEPA 2008 WATER QUALITY REPORT SECTION C: MANAGING WATER QUALITY, 
supra note 28, at C-15; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATERS DATA, 
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the level of other states, Ohio is at an economic disadvantage.69  If Ohio reduces its 
nonpoint source pollution quantifiably, then fewer point sources and industries must 
bear the sole burden of improving water quality.70  The nexus between economics, 
water quality, and a watershed-approach to zoning and land use is a compelling 
reason alone for change, even if increased water quality alone is not.   
Currently, Ohio’s water-resource management remains polarized—success and 
failure abound.  The state is a recognized leader in the U.S. for innovative methods 
of water quality monitoring and data assessment of environmental stressors.71  Also, 
according to the 2008 Ohio Water Quality Report, Ohio’s “large rivers”72 and their 
watersheds stand at 78.7% full attainment of the state’s goals, compared to the same 
large rivers’ 62% attainment in the 1990s, and merely 21% attainment during the 
1980s.73 
The same statistics highlight Ohio’s failure because Ohio’s own attainment goals 
are only 80% of the federal minimum standards, making the rate of improvement 
commendable, but still falling short of what is required.74  Out of 249 surface waters 
monitored, 241 failed to meet the federal minimum water quality standards.75  
Nonpoint source pollution is the principal cause of the deficiency, and most of 
Ohio’s watershed impairments are due to physical modifications and urbanization of 
the landscape.76  The OEPA attributes its incremental success in improving water 
quality over the year to its water quality monitoring efforts, but the agency’s 2008 
report concludes more somberly, that “with proper planning of [land use] 
development, many of these problems can be mitigated or avoided entirely.”77 
                                                          
http://www.epa.gov/waters/data/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) (compilation of water 
quality data, statistics, and general information). 
 
69
 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATERS DATA, supra note 68. 
 
70
 See OEPA 2008 WATER QUALITY REPORT SECTION C: MANAGING WATER QUALITY, 
supra note 28.  
 
71
 See OEPA 2008 WATER QUALITY REPORT SECTION A: OVERVIEW, supra note 42, at A-1, 
A-3.  In other words, Ohio is a leader at knowing precisely how bad the current state of water 
resources actually are in the state. 
 
72
 The Ohio EPA designates twenty-three “large rivers” in Ohio as those that drain more 
than 500 square miles.  Id. at A-5.  
 
73
 Id.  
 
74
 Id.  
 
75
 Id.  
 
76
 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT DATABASE, 
http://www.epa.gov/waters/305b/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2008); OEPA 2008 WATER 
QUALITY REPORT SECTION A: OVERVIEW, supra note 42, at A-7.  The “top 5” impairments 
being: siltration/sediment, nutrients, habitat modification, hydromodification, organic 
enrichment/ dissolved oxygen.  For scientific details of these impairments see id. at A-8. 
 
77
 OEPA 2008 WATER QUALITY REPORT SECTION A: OVERVIEW, supra note 42, at A-10 
(emphasis added).  
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III.  THE WATERSHED APPROACH TO LAND USE: A SOLUTION TO NONPOINT SOURCE 
POLLUTION 
A.  The Watershed Approach Planning Model 
A “watershed” is an elusive concept.  It is a geographical unit with hydrological 
boundaries, typically spanning land areas across several political jurisdictions; thus, 
it does not operate as a jurisdictional planning unit.78  As a unit, a “watershed” 
generally refers to the area of land defined by a common drainage basin that 
contributes runoff to a common outlet—a point on a larger stream, a lake, an 
underlying aquifer, or an ocean.79  Accordingly, every watershed has unique 
biological and land area characteristics; factors such as population density, 
geography, land use, and existing water quality are determinative of these 
characteristics.80  Therefore, local governments, whose jurisdictions cross particular 
watersheds, are best equipped to agree upon land use controls and planning to 
improve the health of those watersheds.81 
Broadly, a “watershed-approach” is a comprehensive effort to address causes of 
water pollution within a watershed.82  The U.S. EPA identifies three common 
features of a watershed approach: (1) hydrological boundaries as a geologic focus; 
(2) well-integrated partnerships—including both private and public stakeholders; and 
(3) action driven by environmental objectives and scientific evidence.83  Integrated 
“watershed management” requires control over both land use and water resources.84   
                                                          
 
78
 See SUSAN HILL MACKENZIE, INTEGRATED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: THE ECOSYSTEM 
APPROACH TO THE GREAT LAKES BASIN 200-03 (1996); Tarlock, supra note 9, at 161-62; 
Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 1088-94 
(1995).  
 
79
 U.S. EPA WATERSHED PROTECTION APPROACH, supra note 40, at 3.  
 
80
 Id.  As part of the Great Lakes, Lake Erie is not just managed in Ohio, but also by 
federal regulations, interstate agreements and coalitions among many Midwest states, and the 
Great Lakes Compact.  See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1258; OHIO REV. CODE §1522.01-08; 
GREAT LAKES BASIN COMPACT & LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, available at 
http://www.glc.org/about/glbc.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).   Other than citing Lake Erie 
as an example, Lake Erie is not intended to be covered by this Article’s proposed watershed 
planning framework. 
 
81
 See U.S. EPA WATERSHED PROTECTION APPROACH, supra note 40, at 1.  The U.S. EPA 
defines a watershed action plan as “an itemization of the problems, priorities and activities the 
local watershed group would like to address. . . .  [I]t serves as a guide for the watershed group 
by mapping a strategy for improving or protecting the watershed. . . .  A watershed action plan 
will . . . accurately identify pollutants and pollution sources so that appropriate and effective 
solutions can be formulated.”  OHIO ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A GUIDE TO DEVELOPING LOCAL 
WATERSHED ACTION PLANS IN OHIO (1997), available at 
http://www.uptuscwatershed.org/Cuyahoga/action_plan/wsguide.pdf; see also Allion v. City 
of Toledo, 124 N.E. 237, 238 (Ohio 1919) (recognizing generally that local authorities are 
presumed to be familiar with local conditions and the needs of their respective communities). 
 
82
 U.S. EPA WATERSHED PROTECTION APPROACH, supra note 40, at 7. 
 
83
 Id. at 2.     
 
84
 Id. at 4.  The control over water itself—groundwater rights and extraction—is outside 
the scope of this Article.  Control over water resources refers generally to surface waters 
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The watershed approach planning model is the most effective framework to abate 
nonpoint source pollution because it addresses the sources of pollution in a holistic 
manner.85  For this reason, the U.S. EPA recommends that states implement a 
“watershed approach” for land use planning to reduce nonpoint source pollution, as 
an environmental and economic solution.86  For states with the political will to do so, 
the U.S. EPA and its state-partner agencies, such as the OEPA, provide extensive 
guidance documents, model legislation, and sample statewide watershed 
management plans, in addition to grant funding.87  Both agencies, in appealing to a 
broad audience, have developed extensive, user-friendly websites focused on 
educating the public and local governments about watersheds and watershed 
planning.88 
B.  Current Watershed Approach Model in Ohio 
Watershed management planning in Ohio is not a novel concept—just 
underutilized.  Dozens of administrative agencies, political subdivisions, and 
volunteer grassroots organizations already conduct watershed planning in the state.89  
Existing utilization of a watershed approach to monitoring water quality and land use 
planning—at least in some communities—is valuable leverage the state should use 
                                                          
within local governments’ jurisdictions, and the land areas accompanying the waters’ drainage 
basins—i.e. the “watershed.”  See Tarlock, supra note 9, at 161.  This Article refers to 
“watershed management” generally to mean management over an implemented watershed 
approach comprehensive plan.  The U.S. EPA uses the phrase “watershed management” 
generally to mean any number of diverse programs seeking to reduce water pollution, such as 
waste allocations for point sources under the CWA.  See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(e), 1312(a) (2006) 
(allocations according to Section 303 of the CWA). 
 
85
 See U.S. EPA WATERSHED APPROACH, supra note 9. 
 
86
 See id.; Lebowitz, supra note 14, at 113 (noting that the EPA adopted the Watershed 
Approach as a framework for environmental management in 1996); see also OFFICE OF 
WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A REVIEW OF STATEWIDE WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 
APPROACHES 7 (2002), available at http:www.epa.gov/owow/ watershed/approaches_fr.pdf.  
In this 2002 final report, the EPA surveyed twenty states, including Ohio, that implemented a 
statewide management approach to water monitoring and concluded that greater partnership 
between land use planning and zoning is needed for success.  Id. at 1, 50. 
 
87
 See generally OFFICE OF WATER, supra note 86; OEPA NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION, 
supra note 34; OHIO LAKE ERIE COMM’N, LINKING LAND USE AND LAKE ERIE: BEST LOCAL 
LAND USE PRACTICES, available at 
http://www.balancedgrowth.ohio.gov/BestLocalLandUsePractices.aspx (follow “Download 
the Best Local Land Use Practices document here.” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).   
 
88
 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATERSHEDS, http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2010).  The site offers an interactive portion where any person or local 
government official can “surf their watershed” by typing in their location.  Id.   
 
89
 See, e.g., OEPA 2008 WATER QUALITY REPORT SECTION C: MANAGING WATER 
QUALITY, supra note 28, at C-21.  Other agencies include Ohio Department of Natural 
Resources, Ohio EPA, Ohio Department of Development, and the Northeast Ohio Regional 
Sewer District (“NEORSD”).  For a sample listing of watersheds within Northeast Ohio, see 
NEORSD, WHAT IS A WATERSHED?, http://www.neorsd.org/whatisawatershed.php (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2010).  According to the NEORSD, more than two dozen watersheds drain 
into the state’s largest watershed—Lake Erie.  Id.   
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to its advantage.  In short, Ohio can adopt a watershed approach as a comprehensive 
state plan for zoning and land use with minimal administrative and budgetary burden 
because much of the work has already been done.   
First, the state is already divided into watershed “units” for water quality 
monitoring purposes, relieving local governments of this task.90  Second, a prototype 
watershed plan for Ohio’s surface waters already exists.  In 2004, the Ohio Lake Erie 
Commission released a “Watershed Balanced Growth” Plan (“Plan”), outlining a 
comprehensive, watershed approach to maintaining the health of the Lake Erie 
watersheds.91  Ohio’s land use, urban planning, and policy experts laud this plan as 
an “ideal one” for Ohio.92  The Plan is designed as an “action plan” and policy model 
for local governments to follow in order to best link local land use activities with the 
ecological needs of the watershed.93  It provides the following guiding principles: (1) 
protect and restore the health of the watershed and stream integrity to the extent 
feasible; (2) include all economic and environmental factors into cost-benefit 
accounting in land use and development decisions; (3) avoid development decisions 
that shift economic benefits or environmental burdens from one location to another; 
(4) promote Ohioans’ public access to and enjoyment of water resources; and (5) 
encourage land use development initiatives that address the need to protect and 
preserve access to water resources.94 
Ohio local governments should enact zoning in accordance with these parameters 
for two purposes: (1) to reduce nonpoint source pollution in an economical and 
efficient manner and (2) to ensure that zoning and land use practices are accountable 
to a comprehensive plan designed to protect surface waters.  A more detailed 
description of the boundaries of each watershed and a listing of the communities 
residing in each watershed should be compiled into an administrative Watershed 
Code.  
                                                          
 
90
 NEORSD, supra note 89. On its website, NEORSD provides abbreviated fact sheets for 
every area watershed in the northeast region of the state.  Id.  Data is collected for each 
watershed and it is surprisingly detailed.  Id.  For instance, the Euclid Creek Watershed 
collects drainage from a 24.1 square-mile area and is comprised of thirteen different 
communities including Lyndhurst (17.7%), Highland Heights (19.6%), Richmond Heights 
(16.5%), Willoughby Hills (9.9%), Beachwood (8.2%), and the remaining communities 
comprise 28.1% of the land area.  Id. (follow “Euclid Creek” hyperlink).  
 
91
 See OHIO LAKE ERIE COMM’N, LAKE ERIE PROTECTION & RESTORATION PLAN 2008, 
http://www.lakeerie.test.ohio.gov/Portals/0/Reports/2008LEPRplan.pdf (last visited April 13, 
2010).  This particular plan is for Lake Erie but the principles are applicable to any and all 
watersheds.  Id.   
 
92
 Interview with Dr. Wendy Kellogg, Levin Coll. of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State 
Univ., in Cleveland, OH (Oct. 20, 2008).  In August 2009, the Ohio Lake Erie Commission 
and Ohio Water Resources Council announced that the organizations “have taken Balanced 
Growth Planning statewide.”  See Ohio Balanced Growth Planning, 
http://www.balancedgrowth.ohio.gov/BalancedGrowthPlanning.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 
2010). 
 
93
 OHIO LAKE ERIE COMM’N, supra note 91.  It is a policy model, rather than a regulatory 
structure because the State of Ohio will not directly regulate how local governments zone 
under a statewide watershed approach to land use.  Instead, the guiding principles are such 
that zoning regulations are accountable to a comprehensive plan.   
 
94
 See id. at xiii.  
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A third reason why enacting a watershed approach in Ohio is desirable is because 
the prototype plan works.  Most notably, the OEPA attributes the successful 
restoration of Ohio’s Cuyahoga River to application of “Watershed Balanced 
Growth” principles.95  In 2008, after almost two hundred years, a twelve mile section 
of the Cuyahoga River flows free after removal of a dam, and the Ohio EPA 
anticipates full attainment of water quality standards.96  Leading up to this success, 
the City of Kent and Summit County collaborated and engaged the public’s interest 
in the Cuyahoga River’s restoration, and, as a result, the communities collectively 
agreed to modify several dams.97  The communities secured funding from Section 
319 grants and Ohio’s EPA Water Resources Restoration Sponsor Program.98  Now, 
the Cuyahoga River watershed communities enjoy the benefits of flowing water, 
savings on sewage treatment costs, improved access to downtown Kent, and 
enhanced aesthetic areas with a park and recreation.99 
The OEPA applauds the Cuyahoga River restoration as a “success story.”100  
Even so, while “[t]he investment in planning and project implementation has begun 
to yield some measurable changes in water quality,” the OEPA’s report concludes 
more somberly, stating that the “social science aspect of changing land use decisions 
and . . . attitudes will take some time.  The success and future challenge of 
improving water quality lies in the ability to effect change on the landscape that 
translates to [surface water] improvements.”101 
C.  Watershed Management Requires Mandatory Planning  
Planning in Ohio is permissive, rather than mandatory.102  Several reasons favor 
mandatory watershed approach planning over voluntary efforts.  First, the status quo 
                                                          
 
95
 See OEPA, SECTION 319 GRANT PROGRAM DOCUMENTS: TARGETED WATERSHEDS-- 
MEASURE SP-12 WATERSHEDS, at 8-11 (2009), available at 
http://www.epa.ohio.gov/dsw/nps/319Program.aspx (follow “FFY09 Measure SP-12 
Watersheds” hyperlink). 
 
96
 OEPA 2008 WATER QUALITY REPORT SECTION A: OVERVIEW, supra note 42, at A-17.  
 
97
 Id.   
 
98
 Id.  
 
99
 Id. 
 
100
 See id. at A-15;  see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NONPOINT SOURCE GRANT 
PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS: TARGETED WATERSHED GRANT PROJECTS, 
http://www.epa.gov/r5water/wshednps/topic_nps_high.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
 
101
 OEPA 2008 WATER QUALITY REPORT SECTION A: OVERVIEW, supra note 42, at A-11-A-
12. 
 
102
 See Robert F. Benintendi, The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in Ohio: Moving Away 
from the Traditional View, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 207, 207 (1991).  Such planning forums 
include planning commissions whose duty is prescribed by statute with little clarity and 
substantive requirements.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 713.02 (West 2010).  Likewise, a 
regional planning commission authorizes that planning commissions of any kind may 
combine with one or more commissions to cooperatively create a regional planning 
commission, but it is voluntary, and the statute contains virtually no substantive requirements.  
See id. § 713.21.  Under Ohio Revised Code § 3734.52, county or multi-county solid waste 
districts may be created in order to ease the local burden of planning.  See id. § 3734.52(D). 
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continues to fail.  As Part II.D and Part III.B discussed, voluntary efforts throughout 
Ohio fail to reduce nonpoint source pollution enough for Ohio’s water bodies to 
attain the federal minimum standards of water quality. 
Second, the uniquely complex, amorphous, and migratory nature of nonpoint 
source pollution demands a holistic, rather than “spot” improvement approach.  
Polluted water runoff manifests, migrates, and ultimately collects across 
jurisdictions.103  For example, the City of Beachwood, Ohio is a “downstream” 
city—lower in elevation than neighboring jurisdictions—and, as a result, increased 
runoff from nearby development projects causes flooding and damage to the city’s 
receiving streams and drainage basins.104  To ameliorate the problem, the city 
aggressively sought out a watershed-boundary approach to land use development 
and zoning; however, the city’s continued success at reducing flooding damage 
ultimately requires collaboration with dozens of other communities within the five 
watersheds convening over Beachwood’s city limits due to the impact of local land 
use decisions in other parts of the watershed.105  Despite any one locality’s best 
efforts at addressing long-term problems of water pollution, unless the state 
mandates a policy, particular local governments have no real reason to consider the 
effects of nonpoint source pollution any more than their neighbors.106 
Third, and related to the second reason, is the “hold out” problem.  Without 
mandatory, statewide oversight of zoning and planning developments, communities 
can simply “opt out” if they perceive their self-interests to be better served in other 
ways.107  For example, one survey sent to local and regional government 
representatives asked them questions about perceived “obstacles . . . for multi-
jurisdictional watershed management programs.”108  One question was whether their 
community was participating in any form of multi-jurisdictional watershed planning, 
and of those who knew, 50.2% said yes.109  The most common barrier to 
collaborating with neighboring communities was funding,110 but nearly one-third of 
                                                          
 
103
 See supra Part II.A-B.  
 
104
 See CITY OF BEACHWOOD, OHIO, STORM WATER MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 24-25 (2003), 
available at http://www.beachwoodohio.com/stormwater.pdf.  Since 2001, the city has been 
an active member of a voluntary watershed group, the Euclid Creek Watershed Council 
(ECWC), an organization with the purpose of bringing together the ten communities, 
including Beachwood, residing within the Euclid Creek’s watershed.  See id. at 24.  
 
105
 Id. at 3; see also Lebowitz, supra note 14, at 122 (noting the problem of “downstream” 
communities bearing the burden of “upstream” development).  
 
106
 See Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 379, 384-86, 392-94, 410 (2000).  
 
107
 See id.  
 
108
 OHIO STORM WATER TASK FORCE, ANALYSIS OF ENABLING LEGISLATION FROM A MULTI-
JURISDICTIONAL WATERSHED PERSPECTIVE 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.wmao.org/oswtf/storm/documents/FinalReport-OSTF-319-Grant-StormWater-
MGT-Watershed-Basis.pdf [hereinafter “MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL WATERSHED PERSPECTIVE”].   
 
109
 It should be noted that in reviewing the responses to the question, one-third of 
respondents indicated that they either did not know, refused, or skipped the question 
altogether.  
 
110
 Id.  45.2% of respondents who answered that question on the survey stated the most 
common barrier to collaborating with neighboring communities was funding.  
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respondents cited “lack of trust toward neighboring communities,” making it the 
second most problematic issue with multi-jurisdictional collaboration.111 
Competing local self-interests make the “hold out” problem the greatest 
impediment to watershed planning.  This is because local governments base their 
land use determinations on local concerns, and it is clear why they do so. Ohio’s 
local governments compete for many of the same benefits—business, tourism, 
employment opportunities, real property tax deductions, and resident satisfaction.  In 
fact, competing self-interests on a larger scale—regional, statewide, and national—
prompted Congress, in part, to mandate statewide enforcement for other 
environmental problems, such as coastal management, wetlands, floodplains, and 
shoreline development.112  Indeed, the state of Ohio also has the duty to “control and 
conserve its natural resources for the benefit of all the inhabitants of the state.”113  
IV.  LAND USE PLANNING AND ZONING IN OHIO 
A.  Distinguishing Zoning and Planning  
Courts and local governments are misguided when they treat “zoning” and 
“planning” as indistinguishable concepts.  “Zoning” and “planning” are often used 
interchangeably, but these concepts are not synonymous. 114  The confusion between 
the two concepts is a reason why the scope of local governments’ zoning power 
remains muddled, notwithstanding the fifty years since the Ohio Supreme Court 
distinguished the two concepts in State ex rel. Kearns v. Ohio Power Co.115  The 
Court stated that:  
z]oning is concerned chiefly with the use and regulation of buildings and 
structures, whereas planning is of broader scope and significance and 
embraces the systematic and orderly development of a community with . . 
. regard for streets, parks, industrial and commercial undertakings, civic 
beauty and other kindred matters . . . within the police power.116   
                                                          
 
111
 Id.  
 
112
 See Nolon, supra note 39, at 375-79.  
 
113
 State v. Martin, 152 N.E.2d 898, 901 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957), aff’d, 151 N.E.2d 7 (Ohio 
1958) (citing City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 185 (1923))).  
 
114
 See, e.g., State ex rel. Kearns v. Ohio Power Co., 127 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ohio 1955) 
(noting that planning and zoning are not synonymous); Ryan v. Bd. of Twp. Trustees, No. 
89AP-1441, 1990 Ohio LEXIS 5519, at *8 (noting that Ohio cases have actually found zoning 
ordinances by themselves to be comprehensive plans); Benintendi, supra note 102, at 209 
(arguing that Ohio should adopt comprehensive planning and noting the confusion in planning 
and zoning concepts).  In assessing land use cases throughout the United States, Professor 
Daniel R. Mandelker has described Ohio courts’ decisions as “either erratic or difficult to 
characterize.”  See MECK & PEARLMAN, supra note 1, at 11 (quoting DANIEL R. MANDELKAR, 
LAND USE LAW 11 (4th ed. 1997)).   
 
115
 See Kearns, 127 N.E.2d 394.   
 
116
 See id. at 399.  The Court further noted that authority granted to a county board was in 
fact intended “to meet the necessities of a changing and expanding civilization . . . to adopt 
and enforce planning measures whereby facilities and installations which serve the public 
needs in specified areas may be regulated and controlled as to location.”  Id.   
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Planning as a policy-oriented process is defined as involving several features— 
(1) systematically gathering of information that properly informs the 
government of future problems facing the jurisdictional community;  
(2) establishing goals by which to address such concerns;  
(3) actively identifying alternative courses of action and reviewing the 
effectiveness of each; 
(4) selecting and implementing the best course of action available; and  
(5) ensuring that the goals are met after implementing a course of 
action.117 
 
Planning is best described as “the foundation upon which zoning regulations 
should be built.”118  Planning embraces zoning but not vice versa; zoning is a 
“product of planning.”119  The power to plan, when exercised as policy of the state, is 
a function of state’s police powers inherent in its sovereignty under the Tenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.120  There is “no such thing as 
municipal police power as distinguished from state police power.”121  Although the 
state has delegated to its municipalities—through the Home Rule Amendment of the 
Ohio Constitution—122 the power to exercise police powers concurrently with the 
state, where “there is a conflict in the exercise of [concurrent] powers, the state 
                                                          
 
117
 MECK & PEARLMAN, supra note 1 at 66; 1 JOHN B. GOTHERMAN ET. AL., LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW-MUNICIPAL, VOL. 1 63-64 (2d ed. 2004).  Another general definition of 
“planning” takes a more esoteric form, that it is the “physical development of the community 
and its environs in relation to its social and economic well-being for the fulfillment of the 
rightful common destiny, according to a ‘master plan’ based on careful and comprehensive 
surveys . . . of present conditions and the prospects of future growth of the municipality.”  
Benintendi, supra note 102, 210 (quoting Angermeier v. Borough of Sea Girt, 142 A.2d 624, 
629 (N.J. 1958)). 
 
118
 See Benintendi, supra note 102, 210.  
 
119
 See id. at n.19 (quoting 5 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 37.01 
(1978)).  
 
120
 Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 121 N.E. 701 (1918); see GOTHERMAN ET. AL., supra 
note 117, at 738-41 (citing Cleveland Telephone, 121 N.E. at 701).  Gotherman further 
explains, “Municipalities are not independent sovereignties, and therefore can exercise only 
such police power as the sovereign people of this state have in the constitution of Ohio 
delegated to them.”  Id. at 741 (quoting Cleveland Tel., 121 N.E. at 701).  Police powers are 
broad, generally to mean “the governmental authority to enact and enforce regulations to 
preserve and promote the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.”  Id. at 738-39; 
see, e.g., Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963 (Ohio 2002) (finding the state had no 
comprehensive planning scheme); see also MECK & PEARLMAN, supra note 1, at 57 (“In recent 
years, the state has enacted statutes which address land use issues of statewide concern and, in 
effect, take back . . . delegated power. . . for example, a greater concern for the environment 
by regulating the location of hazardous waste facilities.”).  
 
121
 See GOTHERMAN ET. AL., supra note 120 at 740 (emphasis added) (citing Cleveland Tel., 
121 N.E. at 701).  
 
122
 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.  
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exercise prevails.”123  The limitation on municipal exercise of police powers, 
including the authority to make zoning regulations, is inherent in the constitutional 
grant.124 The constitutional grant of zoning power to local governments does not 
abrogate the state’s comprehensive planning power.125 
It is apparent that Ohio has plenty of zoning but little planning.  Ohio courts have 
previously addressed whether municipalities must create their own comprehensive 
plan, but this examination confuses the real issue.  There are two reasons why home-
rule municipalities are not required to zone in accordance with a comprehensive plan 
or create one of their own.  First, their constitutional grant of authority simply does 
not require a self-executing comprehensive plan.126  This point is only obvious once 
the concepts of zoning and planning are distinguished.  Second, Ohio’s General 
Assembly has not adopted a comprehensive plan in accordance with which home-
rule municipalities are required to zone.  It is the absence of a statewide mandatory 
watershed-approach plan for land use that is extremely problematic.  The current 
absence of a watershed-approach planning scheme means only that it has yet to be 
adopted, not that it is impermissible to do so under the Ohio Constitution. 
If the General Assembly adopted a comprehensive planning framework—a 
watershed-approach—municipalities would have to zone in accordance with that 
plan because of the inherent limitations of local government powers. 
B.  Zoning Authority in Ohio 
All authority to regulate any land use—to plan or zone—belongs to the state as 
part of the state’s “police power”—an inherent power of sovereign states reserved 
under the Tenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.127  The state’s “police 
power” is generally recognized as the authority to make regulations for the “public 
health, safety, morals, and welfare” of society and zoning is one function of this 
broad authority.128  In turn, the state of Ohio delegates much of its police power to 
local governments.129   
                                                          
 
123
 GOTHERMAN ET. AL., supra note 117 at 741 (citing Rispo Realty & Dev. Co. v. City of 
Parma, 564 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1990)).   
 
124
 See id.; see also infra Part IV.A.2 discussing the home-rule provision.  
 
125
 An example of the state exercising its planning power to oversee local planning is for 
solid waste management.  See MECK & PEARLMAN, supra note 1, at 68.  With this, the state 
oversee local planning and inquires whether the planning meets specific statutory criteria.  See 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3734.50-3732.576 (establishing the solid waste planning process 
and details the requirements).  The Ohio EPA formulates a management plan under that 
authority, and local governments are further required to account for their own planning.  This 
is also an exception to permissive planning in Ohio.  
 
126
 See supra note 95; see also Cent. Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike, 409 N.E.2d 258, 
280 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) (stating that “Ohio law does not require a municipality to adopt a 
comprehensive zoning plan as a condition precedent to the enactment of zoning legislation” 
unlike townships, with express zoning enabling requirements). 
 
127
 See MECK & PEARLMAN, supra note 1, at 55; GOTHERMAN ET. AL., supra  note 117, at 
740; supra note 121.   
 
128
 MECK & PEARLMAN, supra note 1, at 38-40 .  Regarding the definition of police power, 
“[a]n attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on 
its own facts. . . .  Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order—these 
are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power 
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This delegation of authority creates a “four-track system of planning and zoning 
power”130 inclusive of Ohio’s four local government units: townships, counties, 
charter municipalities,131 and non-charter, or statutory plan, municipalities.132  
Municipalities are further classified as villages or cities—depending on 
population.133 
All of Ohio’s local governments possess one of two types of zoning power 
granted by the state: (1) statutory authority to townships and counties; and (2) 
constitutional authority to municipalities.134     
1.  Statutory Authority 
Statutory zoning is the most common form of zoning authority in the United 
States, modeled after the Standard Zoning Enabling Act in 1935.135  The state 
delegates zoning authority through “enabling” legislation from which local 
governments inherit their zoning power.136  In Ohio, statutory zoning authority 
applies to Ohio’s unincorporated civil jurisdictions—townships and counties.137  The 
Ohio Constitution does not define townships, but recognizes them as units of 
                                                          
to municipal affairs.”  Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).  It is important to note that 
“police power differs from eminent domain in that it involves no taking of private property for 
public use, although it may deprive the owner of his property or impair its value without such 
actual taking . . . [and also] its exercise requires no payment of compensation.”  See  N. Ohio 
Sign Contractors v. Lakewood, 513 N.E.2d 324, 333 (Ohio 1987).    
 
129
 See MECK & PEARLMAN, supra note 1, at 40, 55 (stating that “[a]ll states delegate power 
to local governments to regulate and perform other needed tasks”). 
 
130
 Id. at 55.  
 
131
 A home rule charter may be adopted under the Ohio Constitution Article XVIII, § 7, 
and operates as a city or village constitution.  See GOTHERMAN ET. AL., supra 120, at 52 (citing 
OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 2, 7).  Municipalities can choose their form of government under 
the Ohio Constitution—charter, non-charter, or statutory.  See George D. Vaubel, Municipal 
Home Rule in Ohio (1976-1995), 22 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 143, 152-54 (1995); Stephen Cianca, 
Home Rule in Ohio Counties: Legal and Constitutional Perspectives, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
533, 535-41 (discussing the variety of forms of Ohio governments and the legal implications 
of each). 
 
132
 A municipal government that is organized without a charter, then is under “the general 
statutory plan of government in the manner provided by general laws passed by the legislature 
. . . for cities and villages.”  GOTHERMAN ET. AL., supra 117, at 52.  For purposes of this 
Article, “municipalities” refers to those local governments with home-rule powers. 
 
133
 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII § 1.  Cities have a population over 5,000 residents, whereas 
villages have resident populations under 5,000.  
 
134
 See GOTHERMAN ET. AL., supra note 117, at 836.  
 
135
 See CURRENT TRENDS, supra note 1, at 63; JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS 
E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW 46 (1998). 
 
136
 MECK & PEARLMAN, supra note 1, at 40.   
 
137
 Diana M. Anelli, Municipal Law for the Non-Specialist Attorney: Who’s in Charge? A 
Tour of the Municipal Landscape, 1.1 (OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N CLE INSTITUTE 2003); see 
REBECCA C. PRINCEHORN, OHIO LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW-TOWNSHIP 9 (1st ed. 2004).  This 
Article is concerned with civil townships, referred to only as “townships.” 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
484 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:463 
 
government and agencies of the state.138  Townships’ zoning power is expressly 
limited by the statutory requirements in the Ohio Revised Code, and, accordingly, 
townships’ zoning regulations are valid insomuch as they comply with such 
requirements.139   
One requirement is that zoning regulations bear a reasonable relationship to 
public health, safety, or the general welfare.140  Another requirement, specific to 
townships’ zoning regulations but inapplicable to municipalities, is that zoning 
regulations must be enacted “in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”141  The 
existence of a “comprehensive plan” is a condition precedent to townships enacting 
any zoning regulations.  Because townships derive their zoning authority pursuant 
only to state statute, and the statute requires a comprehensive plan, then townships 
must enact zoning regulations in conformity with the prevailing plan.142 
2.  Constitutional Authority—The Home Rule Amendment 
Ohio’s municipalities derive their zoning power from Article XVIII, Section 3—
the “Home Rule Amendment.”143  Specifically, the Ohio Constitution grants 
                                                          
 
138
 See OHIO CONST. art. X, § 1; PRINCEHORN, supra note 137, at 10.  
 
139
 Bainbridge Twp. Bd. of Trustee v. Funtime, Inc., 563 N.E.2d 717, 719 (Ohio 1990) 
(stating that “authority townships possess to enact local police power regulations is limited to 
that which is specifically conferred by statute”); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 519.01-.99.  
Ohio counties may adopt charters, granting home rule powers.  See OHIO CONST. art. X, § 3.  
Under limited circumstances townships may adopt a “limited home rule government.”  See 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  §§ 504.01-504.04. 
 
140
 This is required for any form of government.  See GOTHERMAN ET. AL., supra note 117, 
at 740; Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111, 1118 (Ohio 2001) (quoting Froelich 
v. City of Cleveland, 124 N.E.2d 212, 216 (Ohio 1919) (stating “neither the state in the 
passage of general laws, nor the municipality in the passage of local laws, may make 
regulations which are unreasonable.  The means adopted must be suitable to the ends in view, 
they must be impartial in operation, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, must have a 
real and substantial relation to their purpose, and must not interfere with private rights beyond 
the necessities of the situation.”)). 
 
141
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 519.02 (West 2010).  Here is the statutory language 
stated in full: 
[i]n the interest of the public health and safety, the board of township trustees may 
regulate by resolution, in accordance with a comprehensive plan, the location, height, 
bulk, number of stories, and size of buildings and other structures, including tents, 
cabins, and trailer coaches, percentages of lot areas that may be occupied, set back 
building lines, sizes of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density of population, 
the uses of buildings and other structures, including tents, cabins . . . . For all these 
purposes, the board may divide all or any part . . . of the township into districts or 
zones of such number, shape, and area as the board determines.  
Id. (emphasis added).  
 
142
 See id.  Cf. Cent. Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike, 409 N.E. 2d 258, 280 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1979) (noting that municipalities, unlike townships, do not need a comprehensive plan). 
 
143
 See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ohio 2006).   
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municipalities “police powers,” and Ohio courts interpret zoning power as an 
exercise of “police power.”144  
The constitutional grant of home rule powers is a distinct characteristic of Ohio’s 
municipalities.145  In 1912, at the fourth Ohio Constitutional Convention, delegates 
proposed the home-rule amendment,—now Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution—
and the electorate overwhelmingly approved.146  A Convention delegate stated 
“home-rule” to mean “the right of the people . . . to control their own affairs.”147  
Ohio’s citizens wanted greater control over local affairs through their local 
government, so delegates drafted the home-rule amendment to abrogate the common 
law doctrine of “Dillon’s Rule,” a doctrine of strict construction “nearly universally 
recognized” throughout the country which limited municipal powers to those 
expressly delegated and necessarily implied.148  Under Dillon’s Rule, Ohio’s 
municipalities operated as “creatures of the state,” able to exercise only those powers 
granted by the General Assembly.149 But under the home-rule amendment, 
municipalities have the power to govern themselves and enact local legislation not in 
conflict with general laws of the state.150  Because of the home-rule amendment, 
                                                          
 
144
 See GOTHERMAN ET. AL., supra note 117, at 7.   Similar to Ohio, California courts 
interprets their home-rule provision as a grant of zoning authority.  See Brougher v. Bd. of  
Public Works, 271 P. 487, 491-92 (Cal. 1928).  Courts in other states, however, such as 
Pennsylvania and New York, have not interpreted their home rule provisions as a source of 
zoning power—the courts distinguish zoning power from general police powers.  See Kline v. 
City of Harrisburg, 68 A.2d 182, 186-88 (Penn. 1948); DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 
749 N.E.2d 186, 188-89 (N.Y. 2001). 
 
145
 GOTHERMAN ET. AL., supra note 117, at 7.  
 
146
 STEVEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION 39-40, 
358 (2004); see also Cleveland Telephone Co. v. City of Cleveland, 121 N.E. 701, 710 (Ohio 
1918) (Wanamaker, J., dissenting) (noting the popularity of the home-rule amendment and the 
fact that “in the ten counties containing the ten largest cities of Ohio, the vote in favor of the 
home rule amendment, Article XVIII, showed a majority of more than 100,000”).  
 
147
 See GOTHERMAN ET. AL., supra note 117, at 6 (citing 2 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 1442 (1912)).  The “home rule 
movement” has a lengthy history; early in the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote 
about the “localist nature of American life, and fairly strong notions of local government 
independence.”  David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2277-80 
(2003).  
 
148
 GEORGE D. VAUBEL, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN OHIO 12 (1978); see also GOTHERMAN 
ET. AL., supra note 117, at 6 (citing Schaffer v. Bd. of Trustees of Franklin County Veterans 
Memorial, 168 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1960)).  
 
149
 STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 146, at 327.  Article XVIII of the Ohio 
Constitution was fashioned after California’s constitution. Id.  However, unlike Ohio, 
California became one of the most progressive states enacting statutes that impose planning 
requirements on local governments for zoning and land use.  See Cal. Govt. Code §§ 65300, 
65860(a)(ii) (West 2008) (as amended in 1984). In two recent Ohio Supreme Court decisions, 
Justice Maureen O’Connor cited to the California Supreme Court’s home-rule analysis as 
illustrative of what the majority of the court should follow.  See City of Cincinnati v. Baskin, 
859 N.E.2d 514, 522-23 (Ohio 2006) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. 
City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776, 789 (Ohio 2006) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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municipalities exercise greater local autonomy in several respects, including the 
power to enact zoning regulations in the absence of enabling statutes.151   
The home-rule provision of Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution 
states, “Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-
government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary 
and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”152  This 
provision grants municipalities two distinct powers:153   
(1) the power of local self-government, and  
(2) the “broad police power to act within their borders,” not in conflict 
with the general laws of the state.   
Assuming that the state of Ohio adopts a watershed-approach plan—requiring all 
local governments to conform their zoning to the needs of the watershed—such a 
regulation would be constitutionally permissible under the home-rule amendment.  
To determine whether a state regulation violates home-rule powers under Section 3, 
Ohio courts decide as a threshold inquiry whether the statute regulates a  power “of 
local self-government, on the one hand, or is a police regulation . . . on the other.”154  
Although intuitively, and to the untrained eye, the constitutional grant of all “powers 
of local self government” would seem to encompass zoning, it does not.  Ohio courts 
                                                          
 
150
 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 858 N.E.2d at 781; City of Dublin v. State, 909 N.E.2d 152, 154-
55 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009);  see also VAUBEL, supra note 148, at 15 (“the proposal for 
municipal Home Rule was intended to accomplish three specific things:  first, to make it 
possible for municipalities to have, if they desired, different forms of municipal organization; 
second, to invest municipalities with all powers of local government not denied to them or in 
conflict with the general laws of the state—rather than only such power as the General 
Assembly might confer; and third, to clarify and expand the power of municipalities to operate 
public utilities”); 2 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE 
STATE OF OHIO 1433 (1912) (George W. Knight, a delegate to the 1912 Constitutional 
Convention, stating the three major objectives of the amendment and the intention to leave the 
state with as broad and much power as it did before).  
 
151
 See Vaubel, supra note 131, 156-57 (1995). 
 
152
 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.   
 
153
 See, e.g., Baskin, 859 N.E.2d at 516; Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 858 N.E.2d at 780; 
Twinsburg v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 530 N.E.2d 26, 28 (Ohio 1988), overruled on other 
grounds, Rocky River v. State Emp’t Relations Bd., 539 N.E.2d 103 (Ohio 1989).   Article 
XVIII of the Ohio Constitution also granted municipalities additional powers including the 
power of self-determination in the form of government, under Section 7, which states that 
“[a]ny municipality may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, 
subject to the provisions of section 3 of this article, exercise there under all powers of local 
self-government.”  OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 7.  Also, under Section 4 of Article XVIII, 
municipalities have the authority to own and operate public utilities.  OHIO CONST. art. XVIII 
§ 4; see, e.g., Pfau v. City of Cincinnati, 50 N.E.2d 172, 173 (Ohio 1943); Dravo-Doyle Co. v. 
Village of Orrvile, 112 N.E. 508, 509 (Ohio 1915). 
 
154
 Vaubel, supra note 151, at 156.  The initial determination in the Canton test to 
determine whether municipal action falls under the “power of local self-government” was 
stated in Marich v. Bob Bennett Construction Co., 880 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ohio 2008), as “‘[i]f 
an allegedly conflicting city ordinance relate[d] solely to self-government, the analysis stops, 
because the Constitution authorizes a municipality to exercise all powers of local self-
government within its jurisdiction.’”  Id. (quoting Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 858 N.E.2d at 780). 
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have long held that “[t]he enactment of zoning laws by a municipality is an exercise 
of the police power, rather than an exercise of the power of ‘local self-government,’ 
as granted by Section 3, Article XVIII, of the Ohio Constitution.”155  The source of 
zoning power as a “police power,” rather than one of “local self-government” is a 
critical distinction because only municipal police powers are limited by a “conflicts” 
analysis.156 
a.  Statewide Concern Doctrine 
The statewide concern doctrine was once conceptualized as a limitation on 
municipal exercise of police power—that municipalities could not enact regulations 
affecting matters of “statewide concern.”157  However, a recent Ohio Supreme Court 
decision, American Financial Services Assoc. v. City of Cleveland, has clarified that 
the statewide concern doctrine is not a limitation on municipal police powers—such 
as zoning—but a means of determining whether a particular exercise of municipal 
power falls under “powers of local self-government” or “police power.”158  This is 
important because the General Assembly cannot override municipal legislation 
promulgated pursuant to the “powers of local self-government.”  The purpose of the 
statewide concern doctrine is to distinguish substantive matters that are “strictly 
local” from matters “statewide” in interest when courts must decide whether a 
municipal regulation was enacted within the parameters of its “power of local self-
government."159  If the regulation concerns a subject matter that “affects the general 
                                                          
 
155
 Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass’n 407 N.E.2d 1369 (Ohio 1980) (syll. para. 2); Vaubel, 
supra note 151, at 175 (stating that “[m]unicipal power to zone remains firmly embedded 
within municipal police power” and also that “there have been no serious deviations [from 
which the courts] . . . consider the constitutional grant of municipal police power to be the 
source of municipal zoning authority”); see, e.g., City of Canton v. Ohio, 766 N.E.2d 963, 966 
(Ohio 2002); Rispo Realty & Dev. Co. v. City of Parma, 564 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ohio 1990) 
(stating that “Ohio law has long recognized that the enactment of zoning laws by a 
municipality is an exercise of its police power as described under Section 3, Article XVIII of 
the Ohio Constitution); Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 167 N.E. 158, 158 (Ohio 1929).  Vaubel 
also cites Pritz v. Messer, for this proposition noting that Pritz recognized zoning as a police 
power—pointing out that “in the absence of statutory provisions, Ohio municipalities would 
still have the power to zone as a consequence of the constitutional grant of local self-
government power under Section 3, Article XVIII . . . [but the court meant] ‘local self-
government’ [broadly as] the total grant of Home Rule powers rather than as a designation of 
local powers which are distinguishable from police regulations.”  VAUBEL, supra note 148, at 
821.  
 
156
 See Garcia, 407 N.E.2d at 270.  The last clause, “as are not in conflict with general 
laws,” modifies only the second clause and not the “powers of local self-government.”  City of 
Twinsburg, 530 N.E.2d at 28.  
 
157
 See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 858 N.E.2d at 781-82 (quoting VAUBEL, supra note 148, at 
1108) (stating that “the term ‘statewide concern’ describes ‘the extent of state police power 
which was left unimpaired by the adoption of the Home Rule Amendments as well as . . . 
those areas of authority which are outside the outer limits of ‘local’ power”); see also Vaubel, 
supra note 131, at 197-204 (discussing several cases where the doctrine was applied to 
municipal zoning and whether municipal zoning ordinances infringed on the state’s power to 
regulate matters of state interest). 
 
158
 See Am. Fin. Servs. Assoc., 858 N.E.2d at 782. 
 
159
 Id. (quoting State ex rel. Hackley v. Edmonds, 80 N.E.2d 769 (Ohio 1948)).  
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public of the state as a whole more than it does the local inhabitants the matter 
passes from what was a matter for local government to a matter of general state 
interest.”160  Matters of “statewide concern” means that “a comprehensive statutory 
plan is . . . necessary to promote the safety and welfare of all the citizens” and thus, 
the power is not one of local self-government.161  Instead, the power at issue is a 
police power. 
Previous cases analyzing statewide concern as a limitation on municipal zoning 
are still relevant because they demonstrate that when the state enacts legislation 
pursuant to its planning power: (1) the exercise of state planning power does not 
implicate powers of local self-government, and (2) municipal police powers—
including zoning—are curtailed by the statewide comprehensive planning scheme.  
This line of cases found that the state statutes enacted pursuant to the state’s 
planning function were properly exercised state police powers of “statewide 
concern” in the face of municipal zoning regulations.  In addition to the fact that 
Ohio is charged with the duty of formulating a plan to control nonpoint source 
pollution,162 the Ohio Supreme Court has upheld natural resource conservation,163 
environmental harms impacting public health,164 and matters with extra-territorial 
                                                          
 
160
 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. City of Painesville, 239 N.E.2d 75, 78 (Ohio 1968) 
(emphasis added).  The Court had previously stated the test in Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 
148 N.E.2d 921 (Ohio 1958), to be that local government legislation infringed on matters of 
statewide concern—and thus exceeded its powers of local self-government—“if the result 
affects only the municipality itself, with no extraterritorial effects, the subject is clearly within 
the power of local self-government and is a matter for the determination of the municipality.  
However, if the result is not so confined it becomes a matter for the General Assembly.”  Id. at 
923. 
 
161
 City of Kettering v. State Emp’t Relations Bd., 496 N.E.2d 983, 988 (Ohio 
1986).  
 
162
 See supra Part II discussing the state obligation to control nonpoint source pollution.  
 
163
 State regulation enacted for the purpose of natural resource conservation is a valid 
exercise of the state’s police powers leaving “municipal authorities subordinate to the state 
police power in matters of statewide import.”  See City of Columbus v. Teater, 374 N.E.2d 
154, 158-59 (Ohio 1978).  In Teater, a municipality challenged a state statute as infringing on 
its home-rule authority because “the statute sought to prevent . . . municipalities, from 
building improvements near, or modifying the course of, a stream outside the borders of the 
municipality and [therefore] interfere with the designation of a river as ‘scenic’ according to 
the state director of natural resources.”  Vaubel, supra note 131, 239 (1995).  The Court 
upheld the state statute as overriding municipal in constructing a water supply reservoir that 
interfered with a designated scenic area pursuant to state statute.  See Teater, 374 N.E.2d  at 
159-60. 
 
164
 Comprehensive state regulation addressing environmental harms impacting public 
health and interest is a function of state police power.  See, e.g., City of Canton v. Whitman, 
337 N.E.2d 766, 768-71 (Ohio 1975).   The court resolved the issue of whether the state may 
require a municipality to fluoridate a municipally owned and operated water supply and 
specifically, whether the state statute requiring fluoridation is a valid exercise of the state 
police power.  Id. at 768.  The Director of the OEPA had directed an order to the City of 
Canton to fluoridate its water.  Id. at 768-69.  The court concluded that fluoridation is 
“intrinsically” a matter of public health, and therefore falls under the state’s police power.  Id. 
at 769-70.  In Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold, 442 N.E.2d 1278 
(Ohio 1982), the Ohio General Assembly enacted a comprehensive measure to address a 
statewide health problem caused by the disposal of chemical by-products from industrial and 
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impact165 as matters of statewide concern.166  Regulation of nonpoint source pollution 
encompasses all three of the foregoing “matters of statewide concern”: (1) managing 
nonpoint source pollution is an exercise of natural resource conservation; (2) 
nonpoint source pollution is an environmental harm affecting the public health for 
drinking water resources and supply; and (3) the migratory nature of nonpoint source 
pollution affects multiple jurisdictions.  State adoption of the proposed watershed 
plan would further the state’s policy choice pursuant to its exercise of state police 
powers in protecting the state’s natural resources, public health, and addressing a 
matter with extra-jurisdictional impact in addition to its duty pursuant to the CWA to 
reduce nonpoint source pollution in the state.  Therefore, state adoption of a 
comprehensive watershed plan is an appropriate exercise of the General Assembly’s 
authority.  
                                                          
manufacturing processes.  Id. at 1279.  The Ohio Revised Code Hazardous Waste statute was 
amended with the “aim and purpose of reasonably assuring that the facilities in the state where 
hazardous wastes would be disposed of would be designed, sited, and operated in such a 
manner as to protect the public interest[.]”  Id.  In furtherance of this purpose, the amendment 
created a Hazardous Waste Facility Approval Board with approval power over the location of 
hazardous waste facilities.  Id. at 1280; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05(D)(3) (West 
2010).  In this case, the Ohio Supreme Court did not differentiate between “political 
subdivision” and “municipality”; however, the court applied a “general laws” and “statewide 
concern” analysis, so authority on the subject concludes that in this case political subdivision 
and municipality are interchangeable.  See Vaubel, supra note 131, at 204.  The municipality 
argued that the amended statute infringed on its zoning authority.  See id. at 218 (stating that 
“although the principal concern in the case focused on whether a general law was involved, 
the court concluded that the location of a hazardous waste facility involved an exercise of 
police power”).  The Court ultimately held that the municipality’s home-rule powers were not 
violated because hazardous contaminants posted a threat to the general public health, and this 
was more of a state interest than a local one.  Clermont, 442 N.E.2d at 1283.  The state 
exercised its police powers by enacting a statewide comprehensive plan.  Id. at 1280. 
 
165
 Matters affecting multiple jurisdictions—such as detachment and annexation of 
territory, and electric lines constructed across multiple local governments’ boundaries—are 
appropriately regulated pursuant to the state’s police powers as matters of “statewide 
concern.”  See Beachwood, 148 N.E.2d at 922-23.  The court stated that “[w]here a 
proceeding . . . is no longer one which falls within the sphere of local self-government but is 
one which must be governed by the general law of the state” then pursuant to the “statewide 
concern” doctrine, a municipality may not, in the regulation of local matters, infringe on 
matters of general and statewide concern.  Id.; see Prudential Co-op Realty Co. v. City of 
Youngstown, 160 N.E. 695, 696 (Ohio 1928) (stating that no extraterritorial authority is 
conferred upon municipalities by the home rule amendment to the Ohio Constitution).  
Similarly in Cleveland Electric, the court upheld a state statute authorizing the construction of 
electric lines across multiple political jurisdictions.  Cleveland Elec., 239 N.E.2d at 78.   
 
166
 Professor Vaubel notes that application of the doctrine remains unsettled but not for 
specific areas of regulation.  Environmental concerns—aesthetic, health-related, and natural 
resource conservation, are consistently upheld as “substantial state interests,” also referred to 
by the courts as “statewide concern.”  Because these areas are upheld as state interests, then 
statutory regulation over these areas receive deferential treatment by the courts.  See Vaubel, 
supra note 131, at 215. 
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b.  Municipal Police Powers 
The next inquiry is whether a state statute adopting a comprehensive watershed 
plan would take precedence over a local zoning ordinance that does not conform to 
the dictates of the plan.  Unlike the powers of local self-government, municipal 
zoning regulations—an exercise of municipal police powers—are limited by any 
“conflict with general laws in the state.”167  This Article proceeds, therefore, with a 
constitutional analysis of municipal “police power” because that power includes the 
power to zone.  With a watershed-approach plan in place, municipal zoning 
ordinances are subject to a “conflicts” analysis—clause 3 of Section 3 which states 
“as are not in conflict with general laws.”168  This simple clause requires an exegesis 
for “conflict” and “general laws.”  The test applied for “conflict” is “whether the 
ordinance forbids that which the statute permits, or permits that which the statute 
forbids.”169  A “conflict” arises only when the statute is specifically tailored to 
regulate the same subject matter as the municipal ordinance.170  Assuming the state 
statute is a “general law”—analyzed below—and an exercise of police power, 
zoning ordinances will conflict with the watershed plan if they are not in accordance 
with that plan, because such ordinances will expressly allow what the statute 
forbids—zoning not in accordance with the watershed plan. 
A “conflict” between a state statute and municipal ordinance requires that the 
statute be a “general law.” 171  A four-part test determines whether the statute 
constitutes a “general law”: (1) the statute must be part of a statewide and 
comprehensive legislative enactment; (2) the statute operates uniformly across the 
state; (3) the statute “sets forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than 
purport[s] only to grant or limit municipalities’ legislative power to do so”; and (4) 
the statute prescribes a rule of conduct to be applied to all citizens generally.172 
The proposed statewide watershed-approach plan for zoning satisfies the first 
part of the “general law” test because the plan would be a statewide comprehensive 
legislative enactment.  The statute proposed by this Article presumes that the 
watershed-plan will deal with all aspects of zoning and land use that quantifiably and 
                                                          
 
167
 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006).  
 
168
 See Vaubel, supra note 131, at 172-74 (noting that the conflicts analysis applies only to 
police power regulations).  
 
169
 Vill. of Struthers v. Sokol, 140 N.E. 519, 523 (Ohio 1923).  This case first established 
the “conflict” test.  See Vaubel, supra note 131, at 184. 
 
170
 See City of Youngstown v. Evans, 168 N.E. 844, 846 (Ohio 1929); City of Akron v. 
Scalera, 19 N.E.2d 279, 289 (1939); see GOTHERMAN ET. AL., supra note 117, at 61.  
Municipalities and the state may exercise concurrent police powers in the same area of 
regulation, so this in itself does not create a “conflict” under Section 3 of Article XVIII.  See, 
e.g., Rispo, 564 N.E.2d at 430; Interurban Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 120 
N.E. 831 (Ohio 1918) (stating that the “[g]overnment cannot divest itself of sovereign powers 
by surrender, nonexercise, or by contract . . . municipalities and the state may concurrently 
exercise police powers in the same field of regulation, but if there is a conflict in the exercise 
of police power, the state exercise prevails and the local exercise is invalid”). 
 
171
 Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 967 (Ohio 2002); Marich v. Bob Bennet Constr. Co., 
880 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ohio 2008). 
 
172
 Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 967 (Ohio 2002); Marich, 880 N.E.2d 906, 911. 
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negatively impact the health of the watershed, similar to Clermont, where the state 
regulation dealt with all aspects of hazardous waste facility locations.173  Thus, the 
Clermont plan presumed, as this Article’s watershed-approach plan does too, that 
when local governments seek to locate hazardous waste facilities, or zone for 
development, local governments will look to the legislative plan for guidance.174  A 
comprehensive watershed plan presumes precedence over all local zoning 
concerns—that is, zoning’s effect on the watershed must be taken into consideration 
when promulgating a zoning ordinance.  Both are distinguishable from Canton v. 
State, where the state legislation was not part of a comprehensive plan for the zoning 
of manufactured homes because the statute sought to regulate only particular aspects 
about manufactured homes—such as taxes.175  The statute proposed here is the very 
type of statewide comprehensive plan that Canton envisions—the passage of the 
plan itself.   
The plan satisfies the second part of the “general laws” test because the plan will 
apply uniformly across the state.  The Ohio Supreme Court does not require literal 
uniform application of a comprehensive statutory scheme.  In Ohioans for 
Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde,176 the Court rejected the notion that a 
statutory framework is not uniform because its application “‘will inherently vary to 
some degree from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.’”177  A statutory framework is a 
uniform one if it “‘applies to all parts of the state without exception, and the basic 
process is a uniform one.’”178  A statute’s application to all local governments is a 
uniform one notwithstanding varying outcomes among the jurisdictions.179  The 
proposed watershed-approach framework will apply to all entities in the state 
differentiating only in result, but not application. 
A watershed-approach plan satisfies the third part of the “general laws” test 
because the statute would be an exercise of state police powers, and it would not 
merely limit municipal legislative power to set forth separate police powers. 180  The 
statute’s purpose is not to limit municipal zoning but, rather, to protect the health of 
the watershed and to ensure that land use in the state does not interfere with that 
purpose.  Zoning in accordance with the plan is necessary for the plan’s success.  
The plan is necessary to improve water quality by reducing nonpoint source 
pollution, and the fact that local governments must zone in accordance with the 
                                                          
 
173
 Clermont, 442 N.E.2d 1278 (Ohio 1982). 
 
174
 See id.  
 
175
 See Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963 (Ohio 2002).  For example, state legislation 
purporting to regulate only the zoning of commercial lot size would not be a comprehensive 
plan, just regulating particulars in the absence of larger plan within the appropriate purposes 
of state police powers.  
 
176
 Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, 896 N.E.2d 967 (Ohio 2008). 
 
177
 Id. at 974 (quoting Marich, 880 N.E.2d at 22). 
 
178
 Id. at 974 (quoting Marich, 880 N.E.2d at 24). 
 
179
 Id. at 974-75.  The Clyde Court distinguished its prior holding in Canton where the 
statute was deemed not uniform because there, “it effectively applied only in older areas of the 
state, i.e., cities where residential areas no longer have effective deed restrictions or no longer 
have active homeowner associations.”  Id. at 974 (quoting Marich, 880 N.E.2d at 30). 
 
180
 See Vill. of West Jefferson v. Robinson, 205 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio 1965). 
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plan—thereby limiting municipal zoning in some circumstances—is merely 
incidental to making this plan work. 
The fourth and final element of the “general laws” test—whether a state statute 
prescribes a rule of conduct for all citizens—is also satisfied by the proposed 
watershed-approach plan because the plan will prescribe conduct for all entities with 
authority to zone.  The Court in Canton narrowly applied the requirement to mean 
that rules of conduct apply to each individual citizen,181 but the Court has since 
relaxed its approach to that requirement, instead finding that the statute must apply 
generally to all those who would fall within the ambit of its legislation.  For instance, 
in American Financial Services, the state legislation purported to regulate predatory 
lending in Ohio and the Court found that the statute satisfied the fourth requirement 
because the statute “established rules of conduct for all lenders in Ohio.”182  
Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court is now likely to find that a watershed plan 
satisfies the fourth requirement of the “general laws” test because the plan will 
establish conduct for all entities responsible for zoning.  
C.  “Home-Rule” as a Political, Not a Legal Barrier 
The foregoing analysis raises the question that, if statewide watershed planning is 
constitutionally permissible under home-rule governance, then why is the oft-cited 
reason against implementing such planning due to “conflicts with home-rule”?183  
The idea that local affairs should be determined locally—the basic proposition of 
home-rule—is deeply engrained in the politics of Ohio’s local governments.184  
Professor David Barron suggests that “American local government law’s recognition 
of home rule, broadly understood, seems to be on a collision course with meaningful 
. . . reform.”185  Maintaining “localism” is so customary that citing “home rule 
conflicts” operates as a mantra voiced by interest groups and lobbies opposed to 
innovative land use change and is one that many citizens, local governments, and 
environmental groups accept as true.186  In Ohio, active opponents to land use 
                                                          
 
181
 Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 970 (holding that the statute at issue did not satisfy the fourth 
requirement because “the statute applie[d] to municipal legislative bodies, not to citizens 
generally.”). 
 
182
 Am. Fin. Servs., 858 N.E.2d at 784 (emphasis added). 
 
183
 See Frank S. Alexander, Inherent Tensions Between Home Rule and Regional Planning, 
35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 539, 540 (2000). 
 
184
 See, e.g., Kevin O’Brien, Ohio Justices’ Home-Rule Decision Shows that Politics Really 
Rules, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 21, 2009, at XX; Kevin O’Brien, Ohio Supreme Court 
Undermines Home Rule and Cleveland’s Future, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 11, 2009, 
at XX (stating “Goodbye, home rule.  Hello, Big Brother . . .  That’s the gist of Wednesday’s 
horrendous Ohio Supreme Court ruling that state law trumps municipal residency ordinances.  
Home rule is a cornerstone of Ohio’s Constitution . . . [the recent decision] . . . was an 
audacious and arrogant assault on local autonomy and taxpayers and, oh yeah, the Ohio 
Constitution.”) 
 
185
 Barron, supra note 147, at 2268.  
 
186
 Id.; see Ohio Smart Growth Agenda, ECOCITY CLEVELAND, Fall 1998, at 3, available at 
http://www.ecocitycleveland.org/pdf_files/sm-grow.pdf, 2-3, 7-9, 12-13 (last visited Oct. 3, 
2008) [hereinafter “OHIO SMART GROWTH AGENDA”].  
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planning reform are developers, home builders,187 farmers,188 the highway lobby,189 
newly growing suburbs, and townships.190 
The status quo prevails due to a misconception over the power that home-rule 
actually confers.  Many reformers—land use planners, lawyers, environmentalists, 
politicians—offer communities “voluntary” or “incentive-based” plans in an effort to 
sidestep mandatory action, assuming that this kind of action is a legal impediment to 
the exercise of all local government powers.191  The cycle is apparent: proponents of 
watershed planning propose change to the extent that they believe political will 
allows, and conversely, politically-outspoken critics of reform, refute political will 
on the basis of “legality.”192  Whichever source of political will is truly the barrier to 
                                                          
 
187
 See OHIO SMART GROWTH AGENDA, supra note 186, at 4-5. Ohio’s state home builders 
association and farm bureau have been mentioned by several individuals in Ohio’s planning 
community, to represent the strongest lobbying efforts to the Ohio General Assembly with 
respect to “smart growth” or “watershed planning” or any other land use planning reform 
measure.  One such individual has even stated that  
Ohioans would want reform [in land use planning] if they were aware of the benefits.  
For those Ohioans who do know about it, their voices have been stymied again and 
again before reaching the General Assembly.  The overwhelming farm bureau and 
homebuilders lobby in Ohio is able to whisk away the legislation somehow . . . so this 
is what we are up against.  
Interview (Anonymous), Cleveland State Univ., in Cleveland, Ohio (Oct. 15, 2008).   
 
188
 Id.  
 
189
 See OHIO SMART GROWTH AGENDA, supra note 186, at 4.  The group argues that the 
highway lobby is  
a powerful industry . . . that grew up with the Interstate highway system and lives off 
the steady flow of [Ohio Department of Transportation] contracts.  This includes 
contractors, cement and asphalt companies, construction unions, and engineering 
firms.  The Ohio Contractors Association and the Ohio Construction Information 
Association are aggressive opponents of smart growth, environmental regulation, 
transit, and regional planning[.]  
Id.    
 
190
 Id.  Local experts contend that: 
[T]he “political system seldom changes direction until there is a crisis.  And, despite 
all the problems created by haphazard [land] development, it’s difficult for many 
people to perceive a crisis.  Communities change gradually; the worst impacts may not 
be visible for many years. . . . [Therefore, land use reform advocates] need to make 
the case with clear language that cuts through the complexity of land use and 
development issues.”  Id.  The opposition is described as “less of a movement than a 
collection of entrenched interests that want to maintain the status quo.”   
Id. at 3.   
 
191
 See Barron, supra note 147, at 2270.  In 2002, one such progressive group, EcoCity 
Cleveland pursued statewide organization under a “Smart Growth initiative.”  In order to “not 
interfere with home rule . . . [l]ocal governments would still make land use decisions. But they 
would have incentives to coordinate at the regional level.”  See OHIO SMART GROWTH 
AGENDA, supra note 186, at 13.    
 
192
 See id.  
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land use reform is ultimately of little consequence because, most importantly, as Part 
IV sets out, change is constitutionally permissible under the Ohio Constitution. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As this Article has explained, a watershed-approach to land use and zoning is 
ecologically desirable, but its successful implementation is stymied because the 
hydrological boundaries do not conform to political boundaries.193  Meanwhile, 
Ohio’s piecemeal-approach to zoning and land use continues to harm water quality, 
depleting valuable water resources in the state and putting Ohio at an economic 
disadvantage to other states privy to the reform suggested in this Article.194  Many 
local political leaders already recognize that Ohio’s current approach to land use is 
antiquated and detrimental.195  One leader’s remarks captures why this Article 
addresses such a pivotal issue in Ohio.  President Kenneth Stillman of the Ohio-
Kentucky-Indiana Regional Council of Governments, one of the areawide agencies 
with authority to prepare a Section 208 Plan under the CWA, stated that—  
[T]he state’s provisions for planning and land-use control are a patchwork 
of weak law, fragmented code, and a plethora of court cases.  Local day-
to-day land-use activity appears to center on individual zoning and 
subdivision approvals with little attention to how those discrete [sic] 
actions compose the ‘big picture.’  We also see . . . no state policy on land 
planning, no single state agency that oversees land planning . . . Ohio 
lacks direction on growth, and the political will to substantially change 
inefficient systems . . . .  One can say that Ohio is thus at a long-term . . . 
disadvantage.196 
Although his remarks are true and sound bleak, this does not need to be the case.  
If Ohio’s General Assembly, through its citizens, gathers the political will to 
implement a mandatory statewide watershed-approach to zoning and land use, the 
General Assembly can do so knowing that it is permissible under the Ohio 
Constitution.197 
                                                          
 
193
 See supra Part II.B. 
 
194
 See supra Part II.C discussing water quality standards. 
 
195
 See OHIO SMART GROWTH AGENDA, supra note 186, at 32.  The article also captured 
another person’s conclusions about home-rule stating that:  
Home rule is a powerful legal and cultural tradition in Ohio . . . but one unfortunate 
side effect is the absence of meaningful coordination or even communication on 
regional, multi-county or statewide development and land-use patterns. Our state 
pattern is really just the sum of local actions, with a result where the total may be less 
than the sum of the parts.   
Id. 
 
196
 Id.  
 
197
 Id.  For a discussion on how political climate affects water resource planning, see 
generally Helen M. Ingram, The Political Economy of Regional Water Institutions, 31 AM. J. 
AGRIC. ECON. 10 (1973). 
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